Storming the Capitol — What Have we Learned & What Comes Next?
Can lessons learned from the past two decades of countering violent extremism guide the Biden administration to tackle the evolving threat to our national security?
The writing was on the walls for what would take place on January 6, 2021. For weeks following the 2020 election, extremists on websites like Parler, Gab, r/TheDonald and MeWe plotted storming the U.S. Capitol. Unsurprisingly, this was not the first time this particular call to action has taken place. As recent as in October, the FBI arrested individuals tied to the anti-government “Boogaloo Movement” and the “Wolverine Watchmen” for plotting to kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, and storm the state capitol building to instigate a civil war.
Although the violent extremists who breached and vandalized the U.S. Capitol were unsuccessful in their goals of mounting a full-blown insurrection and overturning the election results — what comes next? Lessons learned from countering other violent extremist movements may provide clues.
To begin, we should expect a renewed commitment to insurrection. Committed to their causes, violent extremists rarely disband and deradicalize on their own. Rather, seminal incidents like this often serve as a poignant rallying call. In fact, just hours after the police regained control of the Capitol, extremists vowed to arm themselves in advance of the inauguration.
To get ahead of this threat, we can look back to history to see how other violent extremists act. Following the expulsion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, for example, radical Islamist foreign fighters made their way to Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo and Mindanao to continue carrying out their particular version of jihad. In short, their extremist project expanded and the legacy of these fighters continues to motivate ISIS and other related groups today — largely aided by their prolific use of social media. Despite robust efforts to take down extremist and incendiary content from mainstream platforms like Twitter and Facebook, these groups have actively taken to encrypted chat platforms, which now make it harder for law enforcement to identify and mitigate national security threats. Attempting to curb a group’s operational capability does little to diminish their followers’ adherence to their ideology. Instead, we need to be more pre-emptive and invest in efforts that counter intolerant ‘us-versus-them’ perspectives and foster social cohesion, civility, and non-violent civic engagement.
We could re-engage a national dialogue about Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Under the Obama administration, efforts to prevent and mitigate radicalization to ideologically motivated violence, largely known by the catch-all ‘CVE’ acronym, were narrowly focused on containing the threat of radical Islamism. Although DHS’ Homeland Threat Assessment for 2020 notes racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the Homeland, a concerted strategy to address these actors has petered out under the Trump administration. Given this threat to national security persists, it is vital for the Biden administration to tailor prevention approaches accordingly.
The federal government should therefore expand its community engagement efforts and establish rapport with access points that may provide in-roads to individuals vulnerable to anti-government and racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism. This is important considering the federal government may not be the most credible actor to lead this engagement. To be effective in our new fight against violent extremism, the U.S. Government will have to expand its CVE efforts to include outreach to churches, faith-based organizations, and social service providers who can link to counseling, pro-social activities, and even new job seeking opportunities that can serve as off-ramps to address the underlying grievances for why individuals engage in violence. Ultimately, this will require investing more resources and to play catch-up as only a handful of organizations like Life After Hate have received support in these efforts to date.
Finally, we must update our legal framework to address domestic terrorism. Although domestic terrorism is defined in our U.S. legal code, there is still no federal charge linked to this definition. Without a dedicated federal statute outlawing domestic terrorism, violent offenders often receive lighter sentences. As a result, even when ideologically motivated crimes like those committed by white supremacist Dylann Roof terrorize individuals, they are not charged with terrorism. In turn, this creates a cognitive dissonance amongst the public that the type of violence espoused by domestic groups like the Proud Boys is not a form of terrorism.
By establishing a federal charge, the next administration could firmly establish domestic terrorism as a national security threat. As other scholars have suggested, this could potentially increase the number of national resources available to safeguarding Americans — and potentially prevent another attempt to storm the Capitol, perhaps with even more violence and disruption.
