The Writing on the Walls of Afghanistan
In 2013 I led research in Afghanistan on civil society efforts to promote peace and prevent radicalization to violence. Just two years after Osama bin Laden’s death, the Afghanistan — Pakistan region was still roiling, but the U.S. had announced it would begin reducing international aid along with its military presence in the region. The future was uncertain, but after enduring decades of violent conflict, the Afghan people were still resilient and hopeful.
During that year I spent nearly twelve weeks traveling to fourteen provinces — mostly by road and with no security measures — to meet with religious leaders, youth activists, journalists, women political candidates, and human rights activists. My goal was to understand how the international development community could do more with less resources to strengthen the civil society sector.
The work of building democratic foundations — holding governments accountable to be responsive to the needs of their citizens — often falls on the shoulders of civil society. But after years of Taliban rule, the sector was in disarray. The U.S. Government had invested substantial funding into rebuilding the sector since 2001, but a troublesome trust gap was growing. For Afghans wary of foreign interference, civil society was seen as an instrument of the international community that was working with a government that had waning legitimacy. Moreover, while billions of dollars were coming into the country, many Afghans didn’t see the immediate benefit to their lives. In a meeting with tribal elders in Uruzgon, the birthplace of Mullah Omar, a white bearded elder broke down in tears and lamented that this was the first time someone from the U.S. had asked him what his community needs.
As I have published elsewhere, some community leaders were taking matters into their own hands. In Herat, I learned the caretaker of the prominent shrine of the 15th century Sufi saint, Khwaja Abd-al Ansari, was mobilizing social-economic support for some of the most vulnerable people in his social network: widows and unemployed youth by tapping into his religious networks. Where the Afghan government or international aid was insufficient, he was able to secure jobs and prevent families from turning to the Taliban for support.
Not too far away, the Great Mosque of Herat, with its colorful turquoise tiles was another example of religious actors utilizing their resources to mitigate conflict. Where the formal justice sector was too slow to resolve cases in court, Afghans would turn to trusted religious scholars in the mosque to provide guidance and settle cases peacefully through traditional dispute mechanisms.
Although there was a sense of positive momentum in each major city, particularly where credible peacebuilders led work, civil society leaders often offered a haunting refrain: “Here there is peace, but if you travel just half an hour away, the region is controlled by the Taliban.”
In order for progress to prevail, civil society actors needed security. Yet, as government officials touted progress each year by quoting the number of schools erected in Afghanistan, for most Afghans, the sense of peace and prosperity was often relegated to a narrow geographic circumference around capital cities. Outside of these pockets of stability, civil society actors continued to face mounting pressure from the Taliban.
Looking back, as others have asserted, more could have been done to balance the rosy-tinted portrayal of progress. However, Congress’ demands for accountability to justify tax dollars in Afghanistan, and voters’ demands to invest in America’s infrastructure disincentivized international development actors from admitting shortcomings, challenges, or even failures.
Perhaps if there was greater truth in reporting our accomplishments, the speed at which the Afghan government fell may not have come as a complete surprise. A more realistic picture of the security challenges facing civil society and the growing influence and power hold of the Taliban may have helped prepare a better exit strategy for the U.S.
